BOOK REVIEW
HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PENALTY OF DEATH
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. By
James S. Liebman. Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, 1988. 2
vols., pp. xxiv, 884. $130.00.
Reviewed by Michael E. Tigar*
Scholars, advocates and law students should buy this book. Ronald
Sokol's earlier excellent treatise, Federal Habeas Corpus,' written in the
wake of Fay v. Noia,2 has fallen out of date. Death case habeas corpus
litigation has become prolific and controversial. New habeas jurisprudence, and the principles of federal law carried along by it, wash like
waves against the shores of criminal justice. Sometimes the wave
erodes the beach, sometimes it deposits a little more firm ground; the
process shows no sign of ending.
Before writing this review, I asked habeas litigators and knowing
law teachers about the usefulness of Liebman's treatise. Their universal reply was that they had a copy and that it was an invaluable and daily
guide. However, there is more to say about Professor Liebman's work
than a brief paean to its utility. The treatise is valuable because Liebman has uncanny insight into the nature of advocacy and of the judicial
process. He has contributed to scholarship because he tells us about
the state of habeas corpus law today, and puts this understanding firmly
in its historical, statutory and decisional context.
I should warn the reader that the issues discussed in Liebman's
treatise and this review cannot be approached with icy detachment.
Men and women are being condemned to death in quite some number
by judges and juries whose decisions are based upon the principles of
which we speak. One may think these decisions wise or foolish, just or
iniquitous, but I have not met anyone unmoved by the process they
address.
I.

LIEBMAN:

INSIGHT INTO ADVOCACY

To begin with, Professor Liebman understands the idea of the tree
as a metaphor for legal advocacy. That is, he has done more than assemble legal principles and citations in logical form. He has armed his
* Joseph D. Jamail Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas, Austin. B.A.,
1962, J.D., 1966, University of California, Berkeley. Chair, Section of Litigation, American Bar Association.
1. R. Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus (1969).
2. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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readers with a vision of habeas litigation strategy and tactics. To illustrate, let me first describe the "tree" as metaphor, and account for the
metaphor having been lost by many advocates. I will then use
Liebman's analysis of procedural default and the Wainwright doctrine 3
as an example of how his mastery of structure and process make his
book so valuable a resource to litigators.
A.

The Tree as Rationalizing Idea

I know a lawyer named Michael Kennedy. He plans cross-examination by making a decision tree. His notes mark a beginning point. If
the witness zigs in a certain way, Kennedy will follow with a certain
form of counterattack. His notes are not a means of self-confinement:
He is always alert to gifts the witness gives in the form of unguarded
answers. He is always conscious of his goals.
With this meticulously-prepared plan of action, Kennedy can afford to let the witness wander a bit. The onlooker may believe, especially in the early stages of cross-examination, that the witness has been
turned loose to browse. The witness may settle down in the chair.
Only later-too late-does the witness realize that the answers freely
given and the concessions smilingly made are in fact a series of points
from which one cannot turn back.
The decision tree is the advocate's most useful metaphor. Seldom
do lawsuits march in and declare themselves soluble by the invocation
of a single theorem and undisputed facts. Most lawsuits are filed because two people-or two lawyers, which is often the same thing-have
different views of a more or less complex past event. So the lawyer
must "game it out." I tell young lawyers that the first thing to do when
they take a case is figure out a closing argument, persuasively marshalling facts and legal principles. When the goals are defined, then we can
talk about moves and strategy: If the other side responds in a certain
way, what will be our reply? What if they try a different tack? How will
we meet them? And so on. At every stage, we remember the mutability
of facts and the flexibility of legal rules.
Facts are mutable because we never see them in litigation. We see
instead their remnants, traces, evidences, fossils-their shadows on the
courthouse wall. The witnesses recount: They have perceived, do now
remember, can express and want to tell the truth, more or less.
Things-paper, hair, bones, pictures, bullets-parade by, each attached
to a testifier who alone can give them meaning. At proceeding's end,
the advocate will try to impose some order on all of this, and convince
the trier that it makes a certain kind of picture.
Legal ideology, in the form of statements called rules, is more or
less flexible depending upon the legal issue at stake and the fineness
with which lawgivers have woven. An advocate must appreciate how
3. For a discussion of the doctrine see infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
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large are the open spaces in the rules at issue, and have at hand alterna4
tive formulations to match the adversary's-and the judge's-moves.
This view of litigation has fallen out of fashion, partly in reaction to
an excessively cramped vision of it at common law. The decision tree
confronting a 17th Century advocate began with the selection of a writ.
He (and they were almost all "he") then embarked on a merry dance of
demurrers, pleas in bar and abatement, answers, demurrers to the answer and so on to a single point of decision on which the case might
turn. If the writ were inaptly, even though plausibly, chosen, all the
other steps would prove unavailing. 5
This is all familiar history. First code pleading, 6 then the federal
rules, 7 changed matters. One pleaded facts, not conclusions. Inconsistent pleadings were permitted. Discovery became the device for finding out the precise basis of the plaintiff's claim. One was not, in short,
required to chain oneself to a theory of the case until a procedural hour
at which it was fair to expect such a commitment.8
Many lawyers did not hear these signals correctly, and in my experience, some have not heard them yet. Lawsuits are filed on the sketchiest allegations; the parties conduct extensive, expensive and unfocused
discovery; summary judgment motions are heard and denied. The case
slouches toward trial like an ungainly beast, grown seemingly beyond
advocate orjudicial control. Commentators have inveighed against this
discontrol.9 Judges have begun to curb it, by means apt and inapt.10
Lawyers are realizing that their failure to think about conclusions and
to "game out" the case makes litigation more expensive and seriously
alters the cost/benefit ratio of lawsuits.
Most law schools do not devote much time to judicial administra4. I have explored the issues of openness in legal ideology in a book, Law and the
Rise of Capitalism (1977) [hereinafter Capitalism]; a long essay, Crime Talk, Rights
Talk, and Double-Talk: Thoughts on Reading Encyclopedia of Crime andJustice, 65 Tex. L.
Rev. 101 (1986) [hereinafter Crime Talk]; and three plays, Haymarket: Whose Name
the Few Still Say With Tears (1987), The Trial ofJohn Peter Zenger (1986), and Warrior
Bards (1989) (co-authored with Kevin McCarthy).
5. A clear statement of the purpose and operation of pleading at common law appears in J. Koffler & A. Reppy, Common Law Pleading (1969). For a discussion of reducing claims to a single decisive issue, see § 3.
6. See generally C. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading §§ 1-12 (2d ed.
1947) (discussing the impact on common-law pleading of the New York Code of 1848
and subsequent code pleading enactments by other states).
7. See generally C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 62 (3d ed.
1976) (discussing the impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
8. See generally Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1971)
(Brown, CJ.) (refusing to dismiss complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief
can be granted unless there is no state of facts upon which plaintiff could recover).
9. For a thoughtful discussion of the changing climate, see the majority opinion of
Judge Brown and the concurring opinion of Judge Higginbotham, in Elliott v. Perez,
751 F.2d 1472, 1480-83 (5th Cir. 1985).
10. Inapt means include excessive and uncontrolled use of sanctions against lawyers under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
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tion problems, even though these problems are going to dictate the
form of access to justice for the next decade. Many large law firm litigation departments do not think in terms of narrowing issues and focusing efforts. Their methods of staffing litigation often tend to
perpetuate rather than solve the problem of discontrol. Therefore,
many lawyers approach habeas litigation unfamiliar with the procedural
precision and factual clarity that is the hallmark of every successful
petition.
The image of the tree is evocative for another reason. Professor
Amsterdam reminds us in his Foreword to Liebman's book that the judicial temperament is changing, and that the large-scale forceful arguments of a generation ago find less favor today (pp. vi-vii). We must
carefully craft arguments of more limited scope. So the "tree" is
changing. Once we conjured with mighty redwoods. Today, we are the
gardeners of a forest of bonsai trees, carefully encouraging, trimming,
nurturing. The image still serves, perhaps even better.
B. Habeas Corpus and ProceduralDefault
Professor Liebman's treatise is not an introduction to theories of
procedure. However, his mastery of structure and process provides
readers with superb tactical insights, and shows us his worth both as
scholar and teacher. Let us see how he understands the idea of the
tree.
Professor Liebman's approach is exemplified in his discussion of
waiver, or "procedural default"(pp. 127-28). In Fay v. Noia,"I decided
in 1963, the Court revisited English history and federal statutes and
decisions. It held that federal courts have the power to hear a state
prisoner's constitutional claim even if she has not timely asserted the
claim in a state proceeding, and even if access to that proceeding is now
barred by state rules on timing.' 2 The Court held that the statutory
exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 refers only to those remedies available to the petitioner when seeking the federal writ.1 3 The
Court underscored that only the petitioner's "deliberate bypass" of fair
state procedures would bar the way to federal relief14
Fay made real world sense. Criminal defendants must rely to an
extraordinary degree upon decisions their lawyers make. Most defendants are either indigent or without funds to pay for enough lawyer
time to assert every conceivable procedural right. The quality of criminal defense is, in my view, lamentably low. The overwhelming majority
of criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargain. 15
11. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
12. Id. at 426-27, 435.
13. Id. at 435.
14. Id. at 438-40.
15. See generally Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in
the Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19-24 (1970).
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The system depends, in short, upon waivers. Fay provided a mechanism for ensuring that waivers of federal rights would be tested for
voluntariness. Since Fay, the Court has periodically re-examined and
reshaped the deliberate bypass standard. Today, waiver is governed by
Wainwrightv. Sykes, 16 holding that failure by the defendant or counsel to
comply with a state procedural rule may preclude federal habeas corpus
review unless the defendant can show cause for failure to comply with
17
the rule and actual prejudice occasioned by any default.
Professor Liebman's analysis of the Fay-Wainwright tension is masterful. After briefly analyzing the central holding of both cases, he concludes that Wainwright will preclude relief "in certain circumstances" (p.
127). He then categorizes the exceptions to preclusion, organizing
them from fundamental constitutional error to the residuum of equitable doctrine at the core of habeas corpus. Liebman also cites a chapter
or section of the treatise where one may find a full discussion of each
exception (p. 128, nn.10-11).
Let me illustrate the range and subtlety of Liebman's preclusion
analysis. Suppose, for example, that you are appointed to file a writ of
federal habeas corpus for a death-sentenced prisoner. You would, of
course, make sure that a stay was in place, and consult Liebman's chapter 13. You would ensure that state remedies had been exhausted,
hearkening to the able discussion in chapters 5, 6, and 7. These chapters themselves warrant fuller discussion than space permits, because
Professor Liebman has unravelled complex procedural problems in
each of them.
Turning to the merits, you might consult appendices C and D for
well-crafted though incomplete checklists of potential issues. ("Incomplete" is Professor Liebman's word, wisely-chosen so that you will use
this book as a guide and not a crutch; these lists contain several hundred potential issues, with valuable citations of authority.) If you identified a potentially case-winning issue, based on reading the record and
talking with your client and other witnesses, you would then be required to think of the tree. Prevailing on that issue is your goal. If the
state should argue against a stay, or that the claim has not been exhausted in state courts, you will turn to the chapters mentioned earlier.
But suppose you are met with a claim that the issue was not raised
in the trial court as required by state practice, and thus your client is
barred from relief under Wainwright. Let me show you some branches
on Liebman's tree, for this sort of analysis must now be done in almost
every case.
16. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

17. Id. at 87. See also Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural
Default: An Abstention-Based Interest Analysis, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1989) (criticizing Wainwright's bar to federal habeas corpus review based on noncompliance with state
procedural rules as an "unwarranted form of abstention," given the paramount role of
federal courts in the enforcement of civil rights).
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First, Professor Liebman asks whether the claim is so fundamental
that it cannot be waived by silence (p. 127). He does not proceed, as
expected, to a discussion of Wainwright's "cause" and "prejudice"
rules. Liebman knows that cause and prejudice are elusive concepts
that pose special problems for the habeas advocate. Thus Liebman's
strategy tree is constructed differently.
Liebman directs the advocate first to whether the state procedural
bar is "actually and reasonably required by established and evenhandedly administered state procedural rules" (p. 128 (emphasis added)). There are
at least four separate branches in that construction. The advocate must
explore each of them. Liebman devotes chapters 23 and 24 to guiding
her in that process.
There is more. Liebman asserts that the state must have actually
and reasonably relied on the procedural bar in order to invoke it on
federal habeas corpus (id.). Again, further guidance awaits the reader
in later chapters. The advocate is thus invited to step back from the
complex and intractable Wainwright issue, and to consider more carefully crafted and limited answers to prosecutors' preclusion claims.
By framing the issues in this way, Professor Liebman demonstrates
his tactical genius. Wainwright is a prosecutor's case; it aims federalism
and comity concerns directly at the petitioner. Liebman invites the advocate to interrogate the state procedural default rule, and demand an
answer to whether it really serves an important state interest. He
counsels us to put the prosecutor on the defensive by making her justify
the existence and application of her purported rule. Professor
Liebman's discussion thus imposes a discipline upon the claim selection process that is valuable for experienced lawyers and comforting to
the novice, by providing a scholarly taxonomy of the often-confusing
law of default and waiver.
The exercise is all the more important because lawyers are taught
in the ordinary case to sift claims carefully, and not to make a good case
seem weak by including weak claims. Good lawyers do not usually raise
claims that permit the opponent to argue waiver and default because
such arguments tend to weaken the entire case at which they are
levelled. But lawyers engaged in the grim minuet of death must bow to
every partner. The risk of waiver, of "abuse of the writ," of death by
lawyer improvidence, weighs upon them. They need to learn new skills
of triage. They must learn how to identify all potential claims, and to
raise them clearly and quickly, preferably in a single proceeding. For
reasons discussed in more detail below, lawyer as well as client may be
at risk in the event of missteps. Professor Liebman provides a plan for
identifying worthwhile claims and the means of putting them in a procedural context.1 8
18. In two useful appendices, Professor Liebman provides checklists of issues relating to a criminal conviction, and a death sentence (pp. 709-36). In another appendix,

1990]

HABEAS CORPUS

Some will fault Liebman for the adversarial style of his book. For
example, in section 7.2, he lists many arguments that an indigent may
make to obtain counsel and other services in a habeas case. He does
not tell the advocate that impatient federal judges may well deny such
assistance out of hand.
Professor Liebman's discussion was written before the Supreme
Court held, in Murray v. Giarratano,19 that Virginia's post-conviction
counsel procedures did not violate the Constitution, even though they
fail to guarantee individual counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. 20 There was no opinion for the Court, and some Justices's positions keep alive the notion that there is some constitutional right to
legal assistance in the post-conviction process.
Liebman's pre-Giarratanotreatment of this issue is designed to arm
the advocate with arguments for appointing counsel. He assesses and
cites all the relevant cases, including the court of appeals decision in
Giarratano that was reversed by the Supreme Court. 2 ' In this book
designed for advocates, he could not be expected to do more.
One might ask, however, whether he has been too optimistic in
offering up so fulsome a list of arguments. I think not. I have already
argued that no issue can be ignored in capital cases because the stakes
are so high. Furthermore, the increasing death row population and the
pressure of habeas litigation may generate cases that cause the courts
to reconsider and refine positions formerly taken. A clear example
emerged this past Term. In Jurek v. Texas, 22 the Court had upheld
Texas's death penalty statutes against a broad-based challenge. In
Franklijv. Lynaugh, 23 the Court had rejected a challenge to the mitigating instructions provisions of the statute. After these two cases, it
would have been easy to resignedly abandon challenges to Texas's
procedures.
Then Penry v. Lynaugh was decided. 24 The Court held that a trial
judge must go beyond the words of Texas's statute and give meaningful
instructions about the defendant's mitigating evidence. Penry, I am
he lists "potential sources of factual information revealing meritorious federal habeas
corpus claims" (pp. 737-49). These materials will prove invaluable to the initiate and
yet are so thoughtful and innovative that the most experienced lawyer will find them

worthwhile reading.
I have one quibble about this book, which must infuriate Professor Liebman as

well. The publisher has done him a disservice with sloppy proofreading. For example,
p. 341 n.31 cites "Peny v. Lynaugh." In the Table of Cases at p. 814, this case is rendered

as "Penny v. Lynaugh." The correct name is Penry v. Lynaugh, and the error must be
particularly galling to Professor Liebman because the case eventually became Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).

19. 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (plurality opinion).
20. Id. at 2769-70.

21. 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
22. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
23. 108 S. Ct. 2320 (1988).
24. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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told, puts more than 100 death sentences up for reconsideration, and
gives trial lawyers a new defensive tool. Persistent advocacy has
wrought change.
C. Advocacy and the Role of the Client
Professor Liebman also understands that advocacy is about clients.
Clients can provide helpful and often unique insights into the events
that led to their arrest. Equally important, they may have perceptions
about the pretrial and trial process that will not appear from the transcript of record, and may not have been noticed by predecessor
counsel.
Unfortunately this point often goes unheeded. In large firms, civil
litigation is divided up into tasks performed by associates and partners.
Each participant risks losing sight of the whole. In the criminal process,
the daily grind of plea bargains and justice at wholesale tends to distance lawyer and judge from the human values at stake. Lawyers get to
be like surgeons. They scrub up outside the operating theater, and
enter to do their work only when the client is asleep and uncommunicative. Not only does valuable information remain untapped, but this sort
of approach intensifies the sense of alienation felt by people caught up
in the criminal justice system (pp. 25-27). I once wrote that "the law's
customary rigor and customary inhumanity can be crueler than deliber26
ate vengeance." 25 I still believe that to be so.
Professor Liebman wisely admonishes lawyers who take on habeas
cases to leave their offices and go find their clients, and he provides a
detailed outline of what to discuss (id. & appendix E). His outline is
integrated with the taxonomy of legal and factual issues on counsel's
own checklist of possible habeas arguments.
For lawyers who come to habeas litigation from small-firm practice,
public service or the public interest bar, talking to a client will not seem
daunting. Those who have labored in the library of a large law firm,
distant from client contact, may have more trepidation. For both kinds
of lawyers, however, death cases are different. Professor Liebman argues persuasively for a special bond of trust in a capital case (pp.
27-28). He recognizes that even experienced lawyers may find the
world of death penalty habeas foreign. But some habeas issues-such
25. Tigar, Book Review, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 785, 785 (1973) (reviewing Psychoana-

lytic Jurisprudence: On Ethics, Aesthetics, and "Law"-On Crime, Tort, and Procedure).
26. Twenty years ago, I represented a gentle young man named Louis who had torn
up his draft card in front of a CBS television news camera. The prosecutor would not
offer any reasonable sort of deal, so I tried the case to a jury. The young man's significant other was an artist. She sketched a courtroom picture of Louis, large in the foreground at counsel's table. Far away, made much smaller in perspective, the two lawyers
were huddled in front of the judge at a bench conference, debating a legal issue vital to
Louis's freedom. That picture sticks in my mind.
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as ineffective assistance of counsel--can only be developed with the client's help and insight. Litigating a habeas claim will often require interviewing witnesses, unearthing old records, searching relevant places.
Again, Liebman's checklist of information sources, in an appendix (pp.
737-49), will be a valuable guide.
Most importantly, Professor Liebman's work addresses, even if indirectly, the sense of responsibility, even terror, that weighs upon lawyers in death cases (pp. 25-29). There is something chilling about
walking into a jail where a capital defendant is being held. The jail
administrators understand and often willingly shoulder their role in
handing on the accused through a series of processes that may end in
the execution chamber. Their attitudes toward the accused and those
trying to be her lawyers are often dominated by a sense of impatience, a
sense that the process of dying has already begun and should not be
interfered with.
I concede that this is simply my own perception of the capital cases
in which I have been involved and of which I know, but some variation
of these feelings have been expressed by too many lawyers for me to
regard this as happenstance. You are holding in your hands the interests of someone who may be put to death if you lose the case. That is
terrifying enough. It is all the more terrifying because it is unfamiliar.
The procedural steps are complex, requiring many different kinds of
proceedings and intricate legal arguments in federal and state trial and
appellate courts. Liebman's work, which divides the lawyer's tasks into
measurable, understandable segments, can therefore make a significant
contribution to the administration of justice.
II.

LEGAL HISTORY AND FEDERALISM: WATCHWORDS OF THE WRIT

As lawyers tread new paths, their practice and Professor Liebman's
book will invite them to consider the basic purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus. Professor Liebman's first chapter rehearses the debate over the
writ's function in a federal system. Arraying historical evidence, mostly
secondary, he asserts that federal habeas has generally been and was
designed to be a powerful means to redress constitutional error in the
state criminal justice process (pp. 5-24). Professor Liebman's book will
not stand as an innovative contribution to our study of habeas history,
and he does not intend it to. Instead, he does us the valuable service of
citing the work of authors who support and oppose his own expansive
view of the writ's proper role. He gives us the comfort that this role has
a venerable past. His most critical insight is to see habeas as a form
susceptible of carrying different content (pp. 11-12). We are reminded
that the history of habeas is bound up more with views about the substantive rights it might protect than with procedural issues about the
nature of the writ itself (id.).
After reading Liebman's first chapter I sat and reread Ronald
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Sokol's 1969 discussion of habeas corpus history. 2 7 Sokol's work,
whose first edition I reviewed in 1965,28 focused upon the English antecedents to the American writ of habeas corpus. What follows owes a
debt to Sokol as well as Professor Liebman.
A.

The Modern Debate

Both English and American history shed light on the proper role of
habeas. I begin by noting that today's debate is not, at its core, waged
in new terms or over new issues. The ferocity and sense of urgency that
one sees are the product of the stakes being raised, not of the issues
being recast. The spate of death sentences reaching the federal courts
from the states puts docket pressures on trial and appellate judges.
The records in these cases are long. Fearful of waiving anything and
knowing the harsh glance given successor petitions for the writ, good
counsel raise every conceivable argument. Courts have devised special
accelerated procedures for death penalty habeas cases, yet29 these cases
take judicial time that some judges actively resent giving.
Add to this the ideological debate that is a subtext of all death penalty litigation. In most litigation, lawyers and parties agree at some
level of generality about the legal rule at stake. They argue about details of application and the procedures for finding the facts. Federal
habeas death litigation is also argued in this framework because the
Supreme Court has determined that the death penalty may constitutionally be imposed.3 0 Yet many petitioners' lawyers are unabashedly
veterans of the abolition movement. Their clients share these sentiments.3 1 On the other hand, death penalty proponents disapprove of
27. R. Sokol, supra note 1, at 1-27.
28. Book Review, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 914 (1965) (with I.M. Heyman).
29. See Tigar, Judges, Lawyers and the Penalty of Death, 23 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 147
(1989). Those who do not resent the burden nonetheless comment upon it with weary
resignation. An example: In the spring of each year of late, as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals clears its docket, it may affirm six death cases a week. Each one of these is
bound for federal habeas corpus after state remedies are exhausted. In the Fifth Circuit,
with Louisiana, Texas and Mississippi each doing its share, the federal judicial burden
has greatly increased.
30. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-87 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 247 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976).
31. I know that capital defendants are not disinterested critics. But many people
sentenced to death have become articulate opponents of the penalty. See Caryl
Chessman, Cell 2455, Death Row (1954). Chessman was executed in 1960. Then-Governor Edmund (Pat) Brown has revisited the decision not to commute Chessman's sentence in a moving book, Public Justice, Private Mercy: A Governor's Education on
Death Row (1989) (with Dick Adler). Other commentators have included Charles
Culhane and Gary McGivern, sentenced for their alleged role in shooting law enforcement officers. Their death sentences were reversed. McGivern is now free on parole.
Culhane is seeking commutation of his sentence. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1989, at B1,
col. 5. Angela Davis was charged with capital murder in California. See A. Davis, If
They Come in the Morning: Voices of Resistance (1971). I still recall visiting her in her
cell, and appearing in court alongside her. Arthur Koestler was under a death sentence
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procedural delay in part because they believe that lack of celerity robs
the penalty of whatever deterrent effect it may have.3 2
The passion generated by these opposing views sometimes bubbles up from unspoken attitude into public print. A judge of the Fifth
Circuit, in a 1988 habeas case, wrote: "The veil of civility that must
protect us in society has been twice torn here. It was rent wantonly
when [the defendant] robbed, raped and murdered [his victims]. It has
again been torn by [defendant's] counsel's conduct, inexcusable according to ordinary standards of law practice."' 33 The lawyer's misconduct consisted of failing to get some papers filed on time. Judges
hostile to the writ are eager to recount such tales, and the 1989 Fifth
Circuit Judicial Conference featured a full-scale debate on the issue of
lawyer tactics in death cases. 34
Such criticism is hyperbolic and ill-directed. The majority of lawyers in these habeas cases are volunteers who commit untold, uncompensated hours and unreimbursed dollars to the task. These cases call
for extraordinary effort. 35 More prosaically, however, I have in twentyfive years of law practice learned not to be surprised when a lawyer
engages in a little tactical delay. The lawyer who was attacked was
blameless, but judges ought to cut habeas lawyers at least as much slack
as, say, civil litigants.
Out of this judicial frustration come proposals to recast the federal
writ.3 6 Justice Scalia and others have been heard to say that legislation
is necessary to deal with uncertainties in the contours of federal power
in habeas cases.3 7 In fact, Liebman presents evidence of the historically
constant role of federal habeas corpus as protector of constitutional
during the Spanish Civil War. He wrote a most eloquent discussion of capital punishment, Reflections on Hanging (1957). This book played a central role in the English
abolition debate.
32. See Chief Judge Clark's eloquent plea in Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338,
343-44 (5th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1040 (1987); see also
Justice Stevens in Schiro v. Indiana, 110 S.Ct. 268, 268-70 (1989) (separate opinion)
(dissenting from denial of cert.).
33. Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1988) (Jones,J., specially concurring), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3262 (1989).
34. I was present at the debate. No formal record was kept, although the upshot
has been a committee appointed by ChiefJudge Clark.
35. See supra note 29.
36. Chief'Justice Rehnquist appointed a five-member commission chaired by Justice
Lewis Powell, to recommend changes in federal habeas corpus, which issued its report in
October 1989. There is also an ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force, chaired by
Judge Alvin Rubin and ChiefJustice Malcolm Lucas, that reported its views at about the
same time. The Task Force's work has been aided by an extremely thoughtful "background and issues paper" by its Reporter, Professor Ira Robbins. I. Robbins, Rationalizing Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Criminal Convictions in Capital
Cases (1989) (issue paper available from the American Bar Association, 1800 M St.,
N.W., Washington D.C.). As this Review goes to press, Congress is considering significant amendments to habeas procedure.
37. Personal conversation with Justice Scalia, Honolulu, Hawaii (Aug. 7, 1989).
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rights. He argues that the court has only once retreated from its interpretation of the habeas remedy as being as broad as the rights conferred by the federal constitution3 8 and this lapse was swiftly corrected
(pp. 9-10).
Liebman also notes that the basic design of the writ is fairly simple,
and has been hammered out in centuries of litigation on both sides of
the Atlantic (pp. 6-9, 11-12). The procedures set out by statute and
rule are likewise straightforward, dating to the 1867 statute that put the
federal courts in the business of reviewing state court criminal judgments.3 9 Many, if not most, of the complexities that plague habeas litigation today are the product of procedural rules crafted by those
hostile to the basic purpose and design of the writ. A person waggishly
disposed might say that the conservative jurisprudes have succeeded in
devising problems that only they can solve. They now seek to renounce
any role in creating the problems while telling litigants that they must
make concessions in order to solve them.
B.

Unravelingthe Two Strands of Legal History

Lest one think this view uncharitable, I hasten to add that we are
seeing two quite distinct views ofjudicial style in the debate about the
writ, and each has an identifiable lineage in the common-law tradition.
There are, after all, two ways to read the words of old cases and old
oracles.
There is Lord Coke's way, to insist that unless old legal forms are
constantly invested with new and progressive content, legal ideology
becomes an artifact-or worse, a fetter that will require to be struck off.
This was, I have argued, a dominant theme of Coke's most cogent
work, setting out the principles that were to triumph in the English
Revolution. 40 Indeed, if we look to Dr. Bonham's Case, 41 perhaps
Coke's finest achievement, we see this historical methodology yielding
up still-vital principles of judicial independence and judicial review.
Another way is to search in the precedents for ritualistic impedimenta, and cast them down as stumbling stones in the claimant's path.
Jonathan Swift wrote of this judicial style:
It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath
been done before, may legally be done again: and therefore
they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made
against common justice, and the general reason of mankind.
These, under the name of precedents, they produce as authori38. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
39. See R. Sokol, supra note 1, §§ C-D.
40. See M. Tigar, Capitalism, supra note 4, at 218-27; Tigar, Original Understanding and the Constitution [hereinafter Orginal Understanding), 22 Akron L. Rev. 1, 7-10
(1988); see also J. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 68-75 (1968).
41. 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610); see Plucknett, Bonham's Case
and Judicial Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 30 (1926).
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ties to justify the most iniquitous4 2opinions; and the judges
never fail of directing accordingly.
Both methods plausibly lay claim to authenticity, in part because many
of legal ideology's formal rules may plausibly contain different content
at different times without changing the basic form of the rule's statement. The tension between ritualistic and expansive readings has been
a particularly visible technique in the common law, and especially at
43
times of crisis and change.
The debate over the historic function and modem role of habeas
cannot be understood without reference to these antithetical models of
judging. When the Court decided Fay, it began by putting habeas in a
transatlantic historical context. Critics quickly denounced this "magis45
terial historiography" 4 4 and supporters defended it,
(pp. 5-24) with
both sides sometimes forgetting that history written in judicial opinions
is bound to be instrumental and teleological. Both sides found parts of
the common-law tradition to which they could cling.
The ro6t difficulty of arguing about the history of any writ is that
the writ system was on its face so inflexible, and yet as put to political
use had great suppleness. This could be seen, in the late 1500s and
early 1600s, in every field of law touching upon the political and economic interests of the ascendant bourgeoisie. The procedural world of
this time had two other aspects that made habeas corpus, in all its many
forms, both controversial and crucial. First, the debate over jurisdiction among common law, prerogative, equity, fair and market, town
and manor courts-to name a few-was fierce. The debate was fueled
by the disputes between royal and local interests, between common
lawyers and royal power, and between bourgeoisie and gentry. Second,
no court could act unless it could compel the parties to appear. Habeas
corpus in its various forms became the judicial weapon to achieve that
end. Other remedies, such as the injunction or writ, might precede the
order to bring the body to court, but there was usually habeas as a last
46
resort.
Thus, weighty issues central to the English Revolution were being
played out in the context of habeas corpus. It trivializes both this history and the writ itself to characterize these disputes as relatively petty
matters about division of judicial business or jurisdictional covetousness. For me, therefore, the lesson of history is that habeas corpus was
to the Framers of our Constitution a procedural device suited to the
42. J. Swift, Gulliver's Travels 266 (Everyman's Edition 1946).
43. See Tigar, Original Understanding, supra note 40, at 7-10.
44. The phrase was borrowed by Professor Oaks in an early attack on Fay v. Noia.
Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 451
(1966).
45. See Sokol, supra note 1, §§ D-E.
46. This is familiar history, recounted in, e.g., R. Sokol, supra note 1, § B; T.
Plucknett, A Concise History of Common Law 176-98, 353-418 (5th ed. 1956).
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task of enforcing basic rights. After the Civil War, using habeas to police state justice systems did not seem a federalism-destroying extension of habeas's reach.
C. Federalism: The Door Opens and Closes
In addition to the historical differences in judicial style, a second
major tension in the debate since Fay has been expressed in terms of
federalism. To use Gary Peller's apt metaphor, which Liebman adopts
(pp. 11-12), the Court was in 1963 increasing the cargo of federal
rights.4 7 Fay looked to the vessel in which federal courts would bear
them to safe harbor.
Fay in 1963 was, in one sense, of a piece with Dombrowski v. Pfister 4 8
in 1965. In Dombrowski, the Court held that a federal injunction would
issue to restrain state prosecution under an overbroad state sedition
statute. The first amendment trumped the Anti-Injunction Act prohibitions on federal judges enjoining state courts and concerns of comity.
The reader will recall that when the Court recoiled from broader readings of Dombrowski, it did so in the name of Our Federalism, 49 with initial capitals in the original. Able commentators questioned Fay on the
same principle. Daniel Meador argued that "the writ is operating to
redistribute governmental power in the United States and to alter substantially the federal system as originally designed." 5 0
The rhetoric of comity and federalism also adorns Court opinions
that have narrowed access to habeas corpus.5 1 At bottom, one dividing
line between those who favor limits on federal habeas and those who do
not is provided by answering the question, how important is it for state
prisoners to have a federal forum in which to litigate federal issues?
Some, taking heart from Professor Bator's thoughtful work,5 2 reply, not
47. Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 579 (1982).
48. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); see also Tigar, Whose
Rights? What Danger? (Book Review), 94 Yale LJ. 970, 973-84 (1985).
50. D. Meador, Habeas Corpus and Magna Carta: Dualism of Power and Liberty 4
(1966), quoted in Sokol, supra note 1, at 5.
51. See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043-44 (1989) (applying Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), to habeas proceedings. Under Long a state court decision must rest on a "plain statement" of separate and independent state law grounds to
bar federal review thus avoiding the "intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court," Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-42 & n.7; see
Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384-91 (1986) (state court must determine factual
predicate for death penalty); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-91 (1977)
(holding that a state contemporaneous objection rule was an adequate state ground to
bar federal habeas review); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 478 n.1 1 (1976) (precluding
federal habeas relief for fourth amendment claims fully litigated in state proceedings).
52. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 526-27 (1963).
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very. Others, for reasons so ably presented by Professors Peller 53 and
Liebman (pp. 5-24), say the contrary.
The argument continues over whether the limitations of such cases
as Wainwright v. Sykes 5 4 are immanent within the federal writ as defined
in the 1867 statute. Professor Liebman makes the case, and I agree
with him, that those limitations contradict the statutory and constitutional function of federal habeas corpus (pp. 7-9). At the most elementary level, a statute passed in 1867 that expands federal jurisdiction
over the state criminal justice system is not hard to read. The agenda
of Congress in 1867 was clear, and deference to state criminal courts
was not on it. 5 Nor should we be surprised to find decisions in the
ensuing 100 years hostile to Congress's evident purposes. That has
been the history of civil rights legislation and constitutional provisions
at the hands of the federal judiciary. 5 6
Turning specifically to Wainwright, the language of comity and federalism seems misplaced. At a practical level, Wainwright leads to satellite procedural litigation that obscures the path to deciding the federal
issue. Those looking to rationalize the federal habeas process should
examine the procedural quagmire into which Wainwright thrusts many
petitions. In my discussions with petitioners' attorneys, they have estimated that 80%o of the Fifth Circuit writ cases involve waiver issues.
Moreover, the adventitious circumstance of counsel's interjection
hardly seems a sensible hinge on which to turn life and death decisions.
There are cases in which one coparticipant in the same alleged criminal
episode has been put to death, while the other has the sentence vacated, based on which of their trial lawyers was inattentive at a critical
57
procedural moment.
Second, Wainwright turns the sixth amendment on its head. When
the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, the sixth amendment right to
counsel put the former colonies ahead of England. England did not
53. See supra note 47.
54. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
55. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964) (quoted 378 U.S. at 290 (Goldberg, J., concurring)). Kinoy, The Constitutional
Right of Negro Freedom, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 387, 394 (1967).

56. Jones v. A.H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-36 (1968) (§ 1982 held to bar all
discrimination, not merely state action), is a dramatic example. But see Moses v.
Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762, 765-66 (D.D.C. 1963) (§ 1987 construed narrowly to preclude judiciary from interfering with prosecutorial discretion ofJustice Department).
57. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1003 (1983) with Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459

U.S. 1127 (1983). Machetti got a new trial because the state jury selection procedure
was discriminatory. Smith, her codefendant, was executed. The court of appeals held
that his trial counsel had waived the jury composition point by failure to object at trial

or, as Machetti had, in his initial state habeas action. One might ask, as did the dissent in
Smith, 715 F.2d at 1476 (Hatchett, C.J., dissenting), what valid procedural objective of

the state is served by not permitting an objection raised by one defendant to inure to a
codefendant.
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provide a right to counsel in cases of felony until 1836.58 One argument against providing counsel was that the judge would look out for
the accused's interests. Wainwright permits-indeed encourages-the
state judge to say nothing even if the accused's counsel is obviously and
improvidently foregoing a procedural right or failing to raise an obvious defense. 59 It then permits attributing counsel's failure to the accused by invoking an agency theory reminiscent of nineteenth century
contract law.6 0 The presence of counsel thus becomes a potential snare
for the accused rather than a real benefit. This circumstance is aggravated by the problem of incompetent counsel endemic in capital
cases.61

What is the remedy? If federal courts take seriously the burden
thrust upon them by the 1867 habeas statute, by article III, and by constitutional provisions directly and indirectly binding on the states, they
will return to the basic teaching of Fay. They will understand that the
best way for a state to insulate its criminal judgments from collateral
review is to build records in criminal cases that show the accused has
been offered his or her full measure of federal rights.
The best analogy to this is the guilty plea. A defendant pleading
guilty is catechized about certain rights being foregone by the plea.
This exchange is embodied in a record, the making of which is essential
to the validity of the plea against direct or collateral attack. While the
list of rights set out in the plea proceeding may be argued over, the
principle is clear.
In a criminal trial, the state can without great effort mandate that
all accused are informed of a set of basic rights they possess in the system. Judges should let defendants know their rights, and that their lawyer is expected to consult with them before waiving any of these rights.
We might disagree about what is on the list as "basic," but this enumeration would afford some minimal assurance that foregoing a right represents an intelligent and knowing choice. To make such a guarantee
the precondition of upholding state procedural bars makes the process
somewhat less of a game-the sort of game that one wise State
58. F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 9-10 (1951).
59. JusticeJimmy Robertson of the Mississippi Supreme Court, dissenting with two
otherJustices in Evans v. State, criticized his colleagues for having such an attitude, saying: "Our eye must be affixed to justice, not slanted toward Wainwright v. Sykes....
Today we announce an abdication of our responsibilities to administer justice to persons
within ourjurisdiction. We turn our back on responsible federalism." 441 So. 2d 520,
532-34 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264 (1984).
60. Cf. Holt, Recovery by the Worker Who Quits: A Comparison of the Mainstream, Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies Approaches to a Problem of Nineteenth
Century Contract Law, 1986 Wisc. L. Rev. 677. Professor Holt notes that an objective
theory of contract was used to enforce unitary contracts of labor that workers did not
understand. Id. at 681.
61. See Robbins, supra note 36, at 15-58, and authorities there cited.
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Supreme Court Justice has already criticized.6 2
There will be some who argue that such a notion presupposes that
indigent defendants can understand their rights well enough to participate in intelligent decisions about them. There are two answers. First,
two decades of law practice convince me that defendants can and must
be intelligent participants in their cases. 63 Second, our entire system of
substantive criminal law is premised upon defendants knowing, intending and desiring circumstances and results. We do not permit punishment of people who are unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
their conduct. We make prosecutors prove that the defendant knew
something or intended something. Yet when assessing procedural default, courts come perilously close to making the defendant the unwitting accomplice of his own state-sponsored death. To say that this is
inconsistent is a macabre understatement.
Permitting state judges the "easy out" of waiver also poses serious
structural dangers to the federal system. If there is any validity to a
theory that state courts can be counted on to guarantee federal rights,
the theory must rest on the proposition that their actions are at some
point reviewable under some standard. The rationale of Wainwright, as
Professor Peller has noted, 64 encourages state judges to sweep federal
error under the rug. It does so by making it easy to imagine and apply
65
procedural bars that bear no relation to the accused's understanding.
D.

The Death Penalty

One is led by the federalism concerns discussed above to address
the death penalty itself. To refer again to Professors Liebman and
Peller, habeas is only a vessel, and its contents are poured differently at
different times. The United States is the only developed Western nation to impose the death penalty. As Professor Liebman notes, and as
is obvious to everyone, one's attitudes about the penalty inevitably
62. Evans, 441 So. 2d at 524-34 (Robertson, J., dissenting). I do not wish to be
mistaken for saying that present guilty-plea litanies are adequate, even in their defined
role of recording waiver of the right to be tried. I inveighed against such a view nearly
twenty years ago, and while I may be wrong I am at least consistent. My view then as
now was that guilty plea interrogations fail to inform the defendant of the entire range
of rights that she is giving up by pleading. I said that judges ought to explain these
rights to defendants, on the record, and ensure that counsel and the defendant had
conferred and decided to forego them. This was, it seemed to me, a way to make real
the promise of Fay. Tigar, supra note 15 at 1.
63. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
64. See Peller, supra note 47, at 679.
65. These procedural arguments are aside from the Court's sharp contest over the
meaning of "cruel and unusual." Justice Scalia would hold nothing to violate that clause
that a majority of states thought wise. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969,
2975-80 (1989) (separate opinion for four justices). This view is ostensibly rooted in
deference. And while deference to state decisions is plausible when dealing with substantive due process concerns, it is an inappropriate measure when the Court is doing its
article III duty toward countermajoritarian values.
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color one's views about the procedures used to review death sentences
(pp. 22-24).
I am disturbed that the procedural devices discussed in this review
and analyzed by Professor Liebman have become more or less overt
means of getting federal courts out of the death penalty review business. We are seeing death cases in which limits on the writ are hastily
cobbled together to bar entire groups of cases. We are also seeing inappropriate and misguided deference to state decision-makers. For example, the most expansive view of federal power-and one that I
share-would hold that a death sentence could only be carried out if
the standards ofjustice that led to it were fair as measured at the time
of the proposed execution, and not at the time of the crime or at some
point during the review process.
The Supreme Court has taken a different view. In Penry v.
Lynaugh,6 6 applying its decision in Teague v. Lane,6 7 the Court held that
a death-sentenced habeas petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of a
"new" rule unless he demonstrates (1) factual innocence or (2) that the
new rule is of a fundamental character. These exceptions have yet to
be clearly defined in Supreme Court cases.
In Sawyer v. Butler,6 8 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, expanded on
Teague and Penry. The petitioner, Sawyer, was sentenced to death based
upon a prosecutor's jury argument that violated Caldwell v. Mississippi.69
The prosecutor misled the jury by telling them that they could impose
the death penalty secure in the knowledge that reviewing courts would
set matters right if the jurors erred. In sum, the prosecutor argued that
Sawyer should be held responsible for killing somebody, but that the
jury did not need to feel any such responsibility when it decided the
defendant should die. The majority found that Sawyer's Caldwell claim
was "new," and held it to be barred on federal habeas corpus because it
did not fit either of the Teague exceptions. Judge Higginbotham's reasoning encapsulates the unwisdom of habeas limitations crafted out of
hostility to the writ.
The Fifth Circuit had earlier held that a Caldwell claim of improper
jury argument should have been known and anticipated by habeas
70
counsel, so that a successor petition raising it was "abuse of the writ."
How, Sawyer's counsel argued, could such a claim be "old" enough for
abuse of writ purposes, but so "new" that it was barred by Penty and
66. 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944 (1989).

67. 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1072-77 (1989).
68. 881 F.2d 1273, 1279, 1288-89 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Judge Higginbotham

wrote for the majority of nine judges. Judge King wrote for five judges in dissent. But
see Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding

that the Caldwell rule satisfies Teague's ordered liberty exception and can therefore be
applied retroactively).
69. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).

70. Moore v. Blackburn, 774 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1176 (1986).
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Teague? The opinion simply says that "newness" does not mean the
same thing in these two habeas settings. 7 1 Judge Higginbotham cites
no authority for this proposition, which does have a "thin air" quality
to it, giving words different meanings in the same procedural environment without a clear anchor in precedent or reason.
At the root of the majority opinion, however, is a view of the state
jury system. Judge Higginbotham speaks of "blackbox decisions" of
juries, involving "inarticulable judgment and common sense intuition."' 72 Sounding themes of "individual autonomy, federalism, and
populism," 73 he argues that respect for the jury's function counsels
caution in overturning its decision to sentence somebody to death.
For more than a decade, I have known and respected Patrick
Higginbotham as trial lawyer, trial judge, appellate judge and legal
scholar. But I take strong issue with his view of the jury system as a
means of permissibly abandoning our justice system to "anger" and
"retribution." I also think he has decided to ignore some harsh realities about the jury system in the southern states that make up the Fifth
Circuit.
I yield to no one, even Judge Higginbotham, in my regard for
juries. I count most of the cases I have won and lost as fairly tried. But
I know this: Jurors in criminal cases bring their fears and prejudices to
court.7 4 Prosecutors who appeal to those feelings can often strike a
responsive chord. Death cases stem from disturbing events in the community. Most defendants are of a different color or different station in
life than mostjurors. As Professor Liebman warns us, it is precisely the
"typical" capital case-an outsider, often poor, urban, and black, killing
a respected member of a small community-that calls out for federal
appellate review of a prosecution fueled by local outrage (pp. 22-23).
Decades of concern over jury selection, 75 and a few years experience
with directing that peremptory challenges be race-neutral, 76 have not
resulted injuries composed of cross-sections of their communities or of
people who have cleansed prejudice from their souls.
The decision in Sawyer represents acceptance of an invitation to
atavism. Justice Frankfurter counselled his colleagues long ago not to
71. 881 F.2d at 1291.

72. Id. at 1278.
73. Id.
74. In Tigar & McCarthy, Warrior Bards, supra note 4, at scene 1, we have gathered
from trial records some notable examples of the lawyer's art being practiced before hostile judges and biased juries. For example, as the play demonstrates Irish barristers in
the 1800s were pleading for Irish patriots to juries made up exclusively of Protestants.

Catholics were ineligible to serve. There are many tales ofjurors keeping to their oaths
and acquitting despite their prejudices. There were many more ofjurors sending men
and women unjustly to their deaths. Id. Still, I would not lightly counsel a client to waive

a jury. I would rather argue the case to twelve biased people than to one.
75. The process began in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
76. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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be ignorant as judges of what they knew as men. 7 7 The message bears
repeating. It also illustrates another major problem with judicial abdication in death penalty cases. It is true that the Court held in Furman v.
Georgia7 8 that uncontrolled jury discretion is wrong. On the other
hand, some recent decisions suggest that a residuum ofjury discretion
79
is at the heart of a constitutionally-permissible death penalty scheme.
But weaving together these strands of doctrine is not all that difficult, if
one understands the sixth amendment jury and what it was designed to
do.
Our ancestors fought hard for jury discretion in criminal cases.
Their struggle led to two distinct criminal trial jury guarantees in the
Constitution. 80 However, the colonists and the Framers understood
perfectly well that juries could be stacked by the prosecution. Our history as a nation bears tragic witness to that reality. 8 ' So judges are to
police the process to ensure that discretionary does not become a softer
word for arbitrary. The idea that judicial enforcement of a constitutional guarantee is a kind of one-way ratchet for the accused should be
neither controversial nor surprising, given the textual and historic commitment of many Bill of Rights provisions to that proposition.
Judge Higginbotham's view, shared by many conservatives, turns
the idea of "populism" on its head. Here is not the popular will checking the power of government, but vengeful jury responses to demagoguery receiving judicial blessing. I keep hearing the echo of Herman
Melville's words: "But the People in their weeping/ Bare the iron
'8 2
hand:/ Beware the People weeping/ When they bare the iron hand."
The surer, better path for federal courts is to confront death verdicts
obtained by improper means and write large that state courts must develop means to prevent them.
CONCLUSION

Cases like Sawyer tell us just how valuable Liebman's book can be.
Sawyer teaches that even a great decision like Caldwell will be snipped
77. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949). He would have added "and women"
were he to write today. Or perhaps not.
78. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
79. This argument is forcefully made in Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1277-79; see also
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2977 (1989) (age discrepancies in capital
sentences might lead juries to impose death penalty on juveniles unjustly but do not
compel conclusion that it is categorically unacceptable); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct.
2934, 2951-52 (1989) (jury's consideration of mitigating factors ensures reliability of
death sentence).
80. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (right to jury in criminal trials); id. amend. VI
(right to an impartial jury in all criminal prosecutions).
81. The Haymarket trial, chronicled in the play cited supra note 4, is a dramatic
example. The abuses that led to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), provide further example.
82. H. Melville, The Martyr, in Battle Pieces 142 (S.Kaplan ed. 1960).
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back to have limited impact by invoking court-invented procedural limits on the power of habeas corpus. Liebman guides the advocate patiently through the procedural thicket. His treatise contains enough
analysis of broad-gauge issues to fuel the most complex petition or
most taxing scholarly debate. But he also helps the advocate to identify
and use narrower, well-crafted arguments to meet the increasing
number of broadly-stated limitations on the writ.
Professor Liebman's book far surpasses anything that has come
before. He moves ably through the most difficult historical and constitutional doctrine, and shows us the path to applying it. Hejoins a small
band of distinguished law teachers whose scholarship enlightens the academic community while helping the practicing bar fulfill the noblest
and be'st of its aspirations. There is, in my view, no higher praise.
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